Journal of Law and Legal Studies

              

Arju R. Jambhulkar, Maharashtra National Law University, Nagpur*

 View Pdf                                                 DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.17613/j7a9-g827

Abstract

Domestic violence is one of the most prevalent crimes in India. The main purpose of this paper is to explore its economic effect on the nation. The first part deals with the different types and categories of costs incurred privately and socially due to the act of domestic violence. It tries to understand and review the existing cost measure and emphasizes consider the intangible costs also while making the policy related to IPV. The second part deals with a non-cooperative model of a family wherein violence exists and what are the way out or solutions for the victim to control the level of violence. The third part shows the dependence of the business cycle or the impact of the down economy as in COVID-19 on the increasing cases of domestic violence. The fourth part deals with the problem of decreasing the rate of involvement of women in the labour work/force of India. It discusses the effect of family structure on the participation or non-participation of a woman and emphasizes providing more opportunities that would be suitable for a woman in a particular area. The fifth part tests whether the hypothesis is proved or disproved based on the above-discussed matter and the last part disscuss the policy implications of the different findings.

 

      I.          Introduction

The Women Peace and Security index shows that India is in 133rd rank concerning justice, inclusion, security, education, and other factors related to the empowerment of women.[1]Various socio-economic factors impact the growth of a woman. As per the UN report, in 12 months 18% of women between the age of 15-49 years face physical violence from their partner.[2] For the violence on women, one of the most prominent factors is the deep-rooted gender roles and unequal power between the partners.[3]Intimate partner violence impacts the economy on a significant level. As per World Bank, the estimated cost of this violence is up to 3.7% of their, which is nearly more than the country spends on its education system.[4]There are several reports which show the pathetic condition of the victim due to this domestic violence and it does incur a lot of social as well as economic costs in a country. This project deals with certain aspects of the same and how it can be implied to assists the victims due to such crimes.

    II.          Statement of Problem

The act of domestic violence is prominent in the institution of marriage and it's a very pertinent issue to address the same. The pain, mental or psychological trauma comes under the intangible costs incurred upon the victim and those costs are often not considered with policy implication with regards to domestic violence. In a violent relationship, a woman is often a housewife who is mostly dependent upon her partner for resources which leads to her victimization. The era of a pandemic has adversely affected the instances of domestic violence. There is a decrease in the participation of women in the labor market which should be addressed as that would be beneficial specifically for the economy of developing countries like India.

 III.          Hypothesis

1.     There is a need to review the existing cost measures of economic impact on domestic violence.

2.     The level of violence will decrease in abusive/non-cooperative relationship, if the economic opportunities for women will increase.

3.     The is increase in no. of domestic violence cases during the era of a pandemic as the economy was down.

4.     The family structure affects the declining rate of women's participation in the labor force.

 IV.          Economic Costs of Domestic Violence

The Cost of violence is ubiquitous throughout society. All perceptible consequences of violence have a cost. The private cost is related to victims, offenders, government, individuals affected by the violence. It can be direct or indirect. Direct cost is specifically for material inserts, it comes from the utilization of services and goods, capital, and labor; basically, for which there is an exchange of money.[5] Indirect Cost though doesn't include monetary values directly as there may be a reduction in profits and income. There can be four main heads to classify the types of cost direct tangible cost, direct intangible cost, indirect tangible cost, indirect intangible cost.[6] Direct tangible concerns with the actual monetary expenses, e.g., the money spent for the hospital, salaries to the house help, or staff in the home. Direct intangible cost is the pains of suffering, the mental trauma, psychological breakdown due to domestic violence, and it concerns the qualitative of life measures.[7]

The other is a social cost, firstly the one that reflects massive economic difference and second that signifies the social consequences. Domestic violence against women prevents the economy from attaining its whole economic potential.[8] The aggregate demand gets distorted about goods & services connected with the effects of violence by that rerouting resources out of the optimal use whose outcome is a reduction in the standard of living and economic growth.[9] Accordingly, the aggregate supply also reduces due to lower productivity, fewer investment investments etc. In all the depletion in output is larger due to the economic multiplier. Hence, there is a negative impact on the GNP and the well-being of the national economy.

The researchers have categorized certain kinds of costs to organize economic costs of domestic violence and for the proper finding of the required data.

Table 1.1 Categories of cost[10]

With regards to the intangible cost components as suffering, pain or lowered quality of life, there are specifically two kinds of approach to estimate the same that are jury awards and willingness to pay (WTP). Jury Award estimates from non-fatal injuries whereas WTP estimates from both fatalities and non-fatal injuries.[11]The estimation of the value of life referring to an unknown statistical life can be done on the basis of a number of people that are willing to pay for safety, to reduce the risk to their life, e.g., safe automobiles features or smoke detectors etc[12]. On the contrary, the estimation with respect to the lowered quality of life can be compensated through a judicial award.

WTP[13]

Here 0 represents perfect life                                                                 Here 0 represents death

1 represents death                                                                                   1 represents perfect life

By using the method of DALYs, we can estimate the lost healthy life years due to domestic violence on the basis of some data.  before converting the loss of healthy life years into monetary value, there is a requirement to determine the value of life year (VLY).

VSL = SUM [VLV / (1+ r) ^t], where VSL is ascribed value of statistical life, r ids rate of discount, and t is a number of years between incident occurred & average life expectancy. The total value of the intangible cost measures will become DALYs multiplied by VLY.[14]

The emotional costs are rarely calculated in the case of domestic violence as they are difficult to calculate is one of the reasons.[15] It is argued by Cohen and Miller that by not including these costs, there is an underestimation of the scale of impact of crime and inappropriate policy decisions are taken.[16] In the United Kingdom, human costs are considered while making policy decisions. Therefore, along with the other costs, intangible costs should also be considered by using the WTP or judicial award method in the studies related to domestic violence.

    V.          Non-Cooperative Model of Family & Domestic Violence

The initial studies of the family discuss the cooperative notion between both the spouses in a family. However, it is not foreign to us that there is ample no. of families wherein the relationship between the spouses is non-cooperative and there is an occurrence of violence. A model has been presented by an economist wherein a man punishes a woman for her behaviour with violence and she adjusts her behaviour as per her husband's wish and here both can make transfers to each other, the threat point level of utility must be constant.[17]This particular part deals with the interaction between the spouses with respect to domestic violence.

Firstly, consider a model[18] and commence by examining the choices of a man. Let us assume, he has the choice of net transfer and level of violence to his wife, and utility is increasing in the form of behaviour, self-esteem, power, and other psychological factors that may be in a non-cooperative relationship.[19] We assume that in a violent relationship man is dominant as it raises his utility. Hence, man's utility function can be U^M = U^M (S(V), C^M, ŋ) where C^M is his consumption, S(V) are factors as self-esteem and others, ŋ is the marital capital which will be there only if he is married and not otherwise. Similarly, the utility of women can be written as U^W = U^W (V, C^W, U^M, ŋ). As per the empirical evidence it is seen that women's commitment is larger to tolerate the violence due to their love towards the abuser.[20] If the utility of the husband increases by enlarging violence and his consumption, then he would, subject to his budget restraint and restrain that his spouse will live in the relationship will try to increase his utility. Hence, restrained or controlled optimization would be

max_V,C^M U^M = U^M (S(V), C^M, ŋ) subject to U^W = U^W and his budget restraints, …equation (1)

where U^W is the threat point of women or external utility.[21]

Noting that income & transfer choice restrains consumption, equation (1) can be written as,

   Max _{v, t} U^M (S(V), I^M – t^W / P_c, ŋ) subject to U^W = U^W, where t^W is transfer done to woman, P_c is the total price of consumption & I^M is income of man.

A consumption of a woman will equal to her income (I^W) plus transfer to her by husband divided by P_c. If the woman's income is settled then there are no other factors to affect violence or transfers to her. Then the man can choose violence to enhance his utility subject to her minimized utility restraint.[22]

When a woman is unmarried, then her consumption would be C^W_s = (I^W + X)/ P_c. her income and other facilities or services for her support will be available (X). There is also a possibility that the external income could be dependent on her husband's income if there is a divorce between them as α fraction of I^M to her. Then C^W_s = (α I^M + I^W + X)/ P_c. [23]

In consequence, for simplicity, we have to take her utility determining her husband's restraints.

U^W = U^W (V, C^W, U^M, ŋ) = U^W (V, I^W + t^W / P_c, U^M (S(V), C^M, ŋ)) where n also gives utility to woman if she is in relationship.[24] It is two-fold, both negative and positive in the sense that if she acquainted her children to the violent situation then the prior one otherwise the latter.[25] In a situation where ŋ ≤ 0 & utility of man does not effectively enter the woman's utility, she will leave the marriage; or else if the X + α I^M > t^W, which means that there is a required compensation for the loss of transfers by his husband through a divorce; or when no marriage-specific utility is derived. The utility of marriage for a woman increases in her consumption and utility of his husband but decreases with V.[26]

Further, the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and violence of a man should be equated to that of her. From violence and his consumption, a man gets positive utility however, it is contrary for the woman because the increase in his consumption will decrease the net transfer to her resulting a fall in her consumption.

Hence, the utility of women is increasing towards the origin and the man's utility will be maximized subject to the restraint of U^W at the tangency. As the marginal rate of substitution of a woman falls or there is a requirement of more transfer for compensation due to violence, the man will enhance at the lower level of violence.[27]

Income of woman    Consumption       Marginal utility for consumption

which decreases her dependence and the level of violence the man would have committed for the transfer. The greater the happiness a woman receives from her husband's happiness, the more is the level of violence.[28]

 Now, as we have already discussed above that a woman will be likely to leave the marriage if the income outside her marriage increased. However, if her income increases within the marriage, the net transfer to her by her husband will decrease, accordingly lowering the level of violence. The endogenizing of woman's income rather than exogenizing it will result in lower violence. This is a 'Nash Equilibrium' wherein a man chooses the transfer given to her & violence and simultaneously the woman chooses her leisure as a function of his optimizing behaviour.[29] This concept is to make us understand that not only a women's exogenic income but her wage rate also decreases the violence.

  VI.          Business Cycle and Domestic Violence

3.1 Effect of Business cycle on Crime

There is a great impact of different stages of the business cycle on the crime rate. The main factor being unemployment. As the gain through legitimate means will decrease, the chances of committing the crime will increase (need-based and not greed-based).

As per Oxfam India, there is a spike of 15%- 30% rise in the distress calls from the women who are victims of domestic violence and a 100% rise in the complaints of the cases related to domestic violence.[30]As per the National Commission for Women, the cases of domestic violence have been increased in Germany, Italy, the USA, UK, and from India the maximum complaints were reported from Uttarakhand, Haryana and Delhi.[31] As per the latest survey of the National Service Legal Authority, the cases of domestic violence have increased throughout the country.[32]

There is nexus between certain economic factors and family violence. In this part, the nexus will be discussed between unemployment & the down economy giving rise to more DV cases.

The main connection between IPV and employment is specifically related to opportunity as more employment identifies less contact. Due to the employment(out-of-home) both the spouses are not in contact with each other for a significant amount of time. If both the spouses will be at home, there would be frustration between them as there is an invasion in their space. During the working hours, there is less chance of contact i.e., less opportunity of violence between the spouse and enlarging the household income. However, more employment to less violence may be conversed by workaholic individuals.

It is observed that employment is an undisguised measure of a stake of a particular person because it is generally accepted that a person who wants to prevent crimes will likely retain his employment. It has been explained that employment, being an economic capital is a source of stimulus positively and its removal will result in frustration, anger, and behavioural changes with respect to criminal intent.[34] According to the frustration-aggression hypothesis, the men who fear the layoff will have a reduced risk for violence whereas the ones who are laid-off the risk of violence will have increased with them.[35]

The men who fear the stage of unemployment will control their self-esteem and other factors.[36]

As per many feminist theories, the unemployment of men would put one of the methods down regarding exertion of force or threat towards his spouse.[37] If a woman is employed and a man is not in a relationship then a man would feel that by using physical aggression, he may exert his dominance.[38]A German study found that there was a self-reporting from the men who were unemployed or likely to be unemployed shortly that they are feeling an increase in their violent behaviour but due to the greater factor of self-awareness or self-control in them the violence was reduced.[39]

VII.          Declining Participation of Women in Labour Market

In the present era, though the literacy rate of women is increasing their participation in the workforce is going down and intensified in the pandemic. All have the right to participate in the labour workforce. However, it has been observed that the participation level of women in this area is significantly low. As per the analysis of Prof. Gary Becker, no. of women doesn't have attachment towards labour force because the woman with low wage will be discouraged both due to her lower wage and higher wage of her husband.[40]

One of the main reasons for the decreasing participation of women is Intimate Partner Violence as it controls the choice of women and may affect her involvement in the workforce of the country. The abuse will keep the woman in constant fear and low mental as well as physical health which will make her not realize her whole potential incurring a social cost.[41] It has been observed in the NFHS Survey of 20015-2016 that 37% of women have gone through the suffering of physical and sexual violence. In the latest Report of NFHS 2019 reports that the overall violence is 37.2%.[42]The FLFP was 18.6% in 2019 as per report Periodic Labour Survey's annual report.[43]

There are two models with respect to the concerned issue, first which says that the involvement in workforce will reduce the abuse towards a woman and the second one says that woman has to face more violence if her income goes more than that of her husband. Therefore, for the second one, we can look at the model related to the ecological framework of domestic violence by Heise.[44]

This model prefers individualistic characteristics due to which a person can be at risk of violence. The individual factors are significant because they will explain the response of an individual on the micro & Exo systems. It involves the outcomes of different studies e.g., a boy child witnessing violence at home will possibly become aggressive in the future and the girl child witnessing the same will tolerate everything that will happen in her marital life.[45]The microsystem involves situational factors. In a violent marital relationship, the most conspicuous factor is the family itself, male dominance, the family structure, etc. Male who are belonging to families of patriarchal are more abusive or violent than in egalitarian families.[46]A country like India, one of the reasons for IPV is the birth of a girl child as it is thought that a mother is solely responsible for the same however it is not the case and a living son is considered as a crucial aspect to prevent violence.[47] The exo-system is about both formal & social structure as it depends on the changes taking place in the society e.g., unemployment, economic standing have an impact on violence. Poverty is one of the factors for violence specifically in a setup where it is a mindset of the society that a man is a breadwinner and he is not capable to fulfil the same. Hence, as the man cannot constraint women by providing economic support, he uses violence for the same.[48] Level of income matters to the work participation rate of a woman. If the household income rises, the reliance on the salary of women will fall and her family would want her to leave her job and focus on domestic activities.[49] While discussing the economic angle, the social angle is required to be seen wherein a woman may withdraw from labour force due to her exposure to abusing the environment and hence demeaning the status of a family, if the economic situation of such family permits. One important point is required to be considered that in the context of conservative gender roles, the rise in income will lead to less or withdrawal of women from participating in labour force however, in the liberal context the impact of the rise in income on woman's domestic roles is larger wherein she can enlarge her networks to gain high status in the market work.[50]Therefore, it can be inferred that the woman's participation depends on the family structure in which she belongs.

VIII.          Conclusion

The first part discussess the importance of intangible costs incurred upon the victim which has a very strong effect in a long run. The existing costs on which reliance is placed while formulating a policy does not include the cost of pain or suffering because it is difficult to calculate, however, there are certain findings by economist which should be considered. Hence, the first hypothesis to review the cost measures stands proved.

The non-cooperative model depicts that if the economic opportunities of women increase in a marriage, then violence on her will decrease accordingly as her dependence on her husband will steeply fall. Hence, the second hypothesis stands proved.

The depression or recession in an economy results in increases in the cases related to domestic violence in the particular country. This aligns with the third hypothesis.

The last part which discusses the fall in the participation of women in the labor force is somewhere due to the family structure existing in India. Various social and cultural factors affect a woman thereby not using her wholesome economic potential which is not good for an economy. Domestic violence may be indirectly related in this situation. Therefore, this seems to be in accordance with the last hypothesis.

 IX.          Policy Implications

In order to save the future cost of the criminal justice system, the policymakers should also include the significant costs components (second generational or support of family) that have been left out while making the policies related to domestic violence should be considered. The cost related to damage of property, loss of efficiency of consumption, human costs, loss in household economies of scale should be kept in mind.

A woman should be given alternatives so that she doesn't need to tolerate the inhuman acts of her partner. Although, there may be several transfers from the government to a woman various awareness programs should be organized to let the victims know the availability of facilities. The intervention of the police, court system, divorce settlements will signify the offender to decrease the level of violence or else his spouse will leave the marriage.

In a period, time where the economy has gone down and unemployment is on the rise, the government should provide subsidies or provide unemployment allowance which may reduce the anger, frustration and accordingly reduce the IPV cases.

Lack of opportunities may be one of the most pertinent reasons for the non-participation of women in the workforce. Some studies show that if there are suitable opportunities for women to work, they will do participate in it. So, the opportunities available should be appropriate with respect to that particular area meaning thereby keeping in mind its other factors.

X.          Scope and Limitation

This research is confined to India with respect to the increase in the number of Domestic violence cases in the era of a pandemic. It is restricted to the empirical data of Omaha while discussing the non-cooperative model of family. However, to get the outcome that we have got the reliance can be placed on any other data of similar nature. The discussion with regards to cost wherein it is shown that the intangibles should be considered, the aspect of best cost measure or which cost measures should be measured lie beyond the scope. The discussion on the declining participation of women in the workforce is restricted to discuss the impact on family structure and income on the same.

---

* Maharashtra National Law University, Nagpur

[1] Women Peace and Security Index 2019-20, https://giwps.georgetown.edu/resource/wps-index-2019-20/  (Visited on September 12, 2021).

[2] United Nations Economic and Social Council, May 8, 2019, https://undocs.org/en/E/2019/68 (Visited on March 22, 2021).

[3] Care International Report, "Counting the cost: The price society pays for violence against women", March 2018, https://insights.careinternational.org.uk/publications/counting-the-cost-the-price-society-pays-for-violence-against-women#:~:text=violence%20against%20women- ,Counting%20the%20cost%3A%20The%20price%20society%20pays%20for%20violence%20against,and%20high%20income%20countries%20alike. (Visited on March 22, 2021).

[4] World Bank, "Gender-based violence", September 25, 2019, https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/socialsustainability/brief/violence-against-women-and-girls (Visited on March 22, 2021).

[5]Lorrain Greaves, Olena Hankivsky and Joann Kingston, "Selected Estimates of Costs of Violence Against Women", Centre for Research on Violence Against Women and Children,

[6] T Miller, M. Cohen and B. Wiersema, "Victim Costs and Consequences: A New Look", National Institute of Justice 1995, https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles/victcost.pdf (Visited on March 20, 2021).

[7] L Yodanis, A. Godenzi and A. Stanko, "The Benefits if Studying Costs: A Review for Studies on the Economic Costs of Violence Against Women", 21 Policy Studies 263 (2000).

[8] W. Max, P. Rice, E. Finkelstein, A. Bardwell and S. Leadbetter, "The Economic Toll of Intimate Partner Violence against Women in United States", 19 Violence & Victims 259 (2004) .

[9] Tzanis Day, Katherine McKenna and Audra Bowlus "The Economic Costs of Violence Against Women: An evaluation of the literature", UN Women 2005, 

https://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/vaw/expert%20brief%20costs.pdf  (Visited on March 20, 2021).

 

[10] Tzanis Day, Katherine McKenna and Audra Bowlus "The Economic Costs of Violence Against Women: An evaluation of the literature", UN WOMEN 2005, 

https://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/vaw/expert%20brief%20costs.pdf  (Visited on March 20, 2021).

[11] K.A. Clark, K. A. Biddle & L. S. Martin, "A Cost-Benefit Analysis of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994", 8 Violence Against Women 417 (2002).

[12] S. Brand and R. Price, "The Economic and Social Cost of Crime", Home Office Research Report 99, July 2018 https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/954485/the-economic-and-social-costs-of-crime-horr99.pdf (Visited on March 20, 2021).

[13] Ko Ling Chan and Esther Yini - Nei Cho, "A review of cost measures for economic impact of domestic violence" 11 Trauma, Violence &Abuse 129 (2010).

[14] Ibid at 139.

[15] Sylvia Walby, "The Cost of Domestic Violence", Women & Equality Unit, September 2004, https://eprints.lancs.ac.uk/id/eprint/55255/1/cost_of_dv_report_sept04.pdf (Visited on March20, 2021).

[16] M. A. Cohen & R. T. Miller, "The Cost of Mental Health Care for Victims", 13 Journal of Interpersonal Violence, 93 (1993).

[17] Gary Becker," A Theory of Marriage: Part I", 81 Journal of Political Economy 813 (1973).

 

[18] Amy Farmer and Jill Tiefenthaler, "An Economic Analysis of Domestic Violence", 55 Review of Social Economy 337 (1997).

[19] Ibid

[20] R. Gelles, "Abused Wives: Why do they Stay?", 38 Journal Of Marriage And The Family 659 (1976).

[21] Amy Farmer and Jill Tiefenthaler, "An Economic Analysis of Domestic Violence" 55 Review Of Social Economy 337 (1997).

[22] Ibid.

[23] Ibid.

[24] Ibid.

[25] Ibid.

[26] Ibid. at 340.

[27] Ibid. at 343.

[28] M McElroy and M. Brown, "Nash-Bargained Household Decisions: Toward a generalization of Theory of Demand" 22 International Economic Review 333 (1981).

[29] M. Manse and M. Brown, "Marriage and Household Decision-Making: A Bargaining Analysis", 21 International Economic Review 31 (1980).

[30] Kanika Arora and Shubham Jain, "Locked-down: Domestic Violence Reporting in India during COVID-19", Oxfam India, August 3, 2020, https://www.oxfamindia.org/blog/locked-down-domestic-violence-reporting-india-during-covid-19 (Visited on March 20, 2021).

[31] Swarajya, "Uttarakhand Records Most Number of Domestic Violence Cases During Lockdown: Report", Swarajya, May 19, 2020, https://swarajyamag.com/news-brief/uttarakhand-records-most-number-of-domestic-violence-cases-during-lockdown-reports (Visited on March 3, 20201).

[32] TimesofIndia.com, "Domestic Violence cases in India on the rise due to lockdown, says report", Times Of India, May 18, 2020, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/life-style/relationships/love-sex/domestic-violence-cases-in-india-on-the-rise-during-lockdown-says-report/articleshow/75801752.cms (Visited on March 21, 2021).

[33] Manob Das, Arijit Das and Ashis Mandal, "Examining the impact of lockdown on Domestic violence: An Evidences from India", NCBI August 7, 2020, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7413053/ (March 21,2020)

[34] R. Agnew, "Foundation for a General Strain Theory of Crime and Delinquency" 30 CRIMINOLOGY 47 (1992)

[35] J. Dollard, L. Dobb and E. Miller, H. Mowrer & R. Sears, "Frustration and Aggression" New Heaven: Yale University Press, 1939.

[36]R. GOTTFREDSON AND T. HIRSCHI, "A General Theory of Crime",1990, Palo Alto: Sandford University Press.

[37] J. Goode, "Force and Violence in family" 33 Journal of Marriage and The Family 624 (1971).

[38] R. Macmillan & R. Gartner, "When She brings home the bacon: Labor-force participation and the risk of spouse violence against women", 61 Journal of Marriage and The Family 947 (1999).

[39] P. Fischer, T. Greitemeyer and D. Frey, "Unemployment and aggression: The moderating role of self-awareness on the effect of unemployment on aggression" 34 Aggressive Behaviour 35 (2008).

[40]Theodore Schultz (ed.), Economics of The Family: Marriage, Children And Human Capital 299 Munich Personal RePEc Archive 1974.

[41] ICRW, "Domestic Violence in India: A summary report of three studies", International Centre For Research On Women 1999, https://www.icrw.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Domestic-Violence-in-India-1-Summary-Report-of-Three-Studies.pdf (Visited on March 21, 2021).

[42] Sakti Golder, "Measurement of Domestic Violence in NFHS Surveys and Some Evidence", OXFAM INDIA https://www.oxfamindia.org/sites/default/files/2018-10/WP-Measurement-of-Domestic-Violence-in-National-Family-Health-Survey-surveys-and-Some-Evidence-EN.pdf (Visited on March 21, 2021).

[43] Periodic Labour Force Survey (PLFS)- Annual Report, June 4, 2020, https://pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=1629366 (Visited on March 22, 2021).

[44] L. Heise, "Violence against Women: An integrated ecological framework", 4 Violence Against Women 262 (1998)

[45] S. Sabrawal, G. santhya and J. Jejeebhoy, "Determinants of Marital Violence: Findings from a prospective study of rural women in India" 48 Economic and Political Weekly 41 (2013).

[46] P. Koss and E. Dinero, "Discriminant analysis of risk factors for sexual victimization among a national sample of college women" 57 Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology 242 (1989).

[47] V. Rao, "Wife-beating in rural South India: A qualitative and econometric analysis", 44 Social Science and Medicine 1169 (1997).

[48] L. Martin, E. Moracco and O. Tulsi, "Domestic Violence in Northern India", INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF EPIDEMIOLOGY, Vol 150 No. 4 1999, pp.417-426.

[49] Ibid.

[50] Sonalde Desai and Omkar Joshi, "The Paradox of Declining Female Participation in an era of Economic Growth", 62 The Indian Journal of Labour Economics 55 (2019).